The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia by Stealey, R. E.
Volume 56 
Issue 2 Issues 2 & 3 Article 4 
June 1954 
The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia 
R. E. Stealey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. E. Stealey, The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia, 56 W. Va. L. Rev. (1954). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol56/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES
IN WEST VIRGINIA
R. E. STEALEY*
In late years the mortgage or deed of trust to secure indebted-
ness that may not be created until after the execution and recorda-
tion of the security instrument has assumed a new importance in
real estate financing. Formerly confined largely to the construc-
tion loan, such financing now often contemplates a possible future
loan equal to any amount which may have been repaid on the
original loan, or the use of the security instrument as general
collateral for future advances, which may vary in amount from
time to time.
Such transactions are subject not only to the usual hazards of
mortgage lending, but the present state of the law indicates other
possible pitfalls. The two general legal problems involved are,
first, the validity of future advances under such instruments as
between the parties and, second, whether the advances have prior-
ity over liens which may attach to the real estate between the time
of recordation of the security instrument and the actual creation
of the subsequent indebtedness by the making of later advances.
This discussion assumes that there are no other liens as of the
time of recordation which might take priority, so that the sole
question is with respect to such intervening liens.
Before discussing these legal problems, it should be helpful
to present an outline of some of the more usual forms which such
an arrangement may assume, as the problems involved are not
always the same in each. The legal questions common to all will
then be discussed, and then those peculiar to certain situations
only. The terms "mortgage" and "deed of trust" are use synony-
mously and interchangeably herein, and "mortgagee" means also a
beneficiary under, or creditor secured by, a deed of trust.
1. The construction loan is the most common form of a
mortgage to secure future advances. It is possible, of course, for
the entire loan to be advanced prior to construction, but the more
usual practice is to advance funds in installments as building pro-
gresses. A basic assumption is, necessarily, that the securing in-
strument is recorded before any work is done or materials furnished
in connection with the construction. If not, it is subject to all
mechanics' or materialmen's liens which may be perfected, and
no question as to priority arises.
Member of the Wood county bar.
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2. The mortgage for future advances, not for construction
purposes, where the advancements are optional, is becoming more
common. This may take more than one form:
(a) The so-called open-end mortgage, in which the full
amount is advanced contemporaneously, but which provides
that it shall secure future loans or advances not to exceed, at
any time, the original amount.
(b) The mortgage to secure any advances, present, or
future, or to secure any future indebtedness. A maximum limit
may or may not be fixed.
3. The mortgage for future advances where the mortgagee
is obligated, or has the right, to make the advances irrespective of
concurrent consent of the mortgagor. The construction loan, of
course, can be of this type.
The use of intangible collateral, i.e., stocks, bonds, notes, etc.,
which are assigned on a collateral agreement empowering the
creditor to sell upon certain specified contingencies, to secure future
advances has long been common and most lenders are familiar with
and understand the more common problems associated with it.
Except for construction loans, however, real estate has been little
used by lending institutions to secure future advances.
Thus real estate loans are customarily made for a fixed amount
advanced contemporaneously, or nearly so, with the execution of
the mortgage or deed of trust. Any further advance then requires
a new mortgage, new note, new title examination and all of the
expense incident to the making of any real estate loan. If a busi-
ness man needs a line of credit in varying amount, say to $20,000.00,
and owns real estate which is acceptable as security for a total
advance of that amount, it is obviously advantageous to both
borrower and lender to use one security instrument which will
secure any advance, present or future, up to that amount. The
borrower is thus able to use his real estate for collateral as effec-
tively as the man who pledges intangible property.
Assuming that the mortgage or deed of trust is duly recorded,
and there are at that time no liens, whether recorded or not, which
would be entitled to priority, two legal problems arise which must
be considered in determining whether the instrument offers and will
continue to offer, until its release, security f6r future advances. First,
is it valid between the parties? Second, to what extent will it be
prior to subsequent lienors or puichasers whose rights intervene
between the recordation of the instrument and the actual making
of the future advance or loan?
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The law is well settled as to the first question. As between
the parties, the instrument will stand as security for any claims of
the creditor which it was intended to secure, past, present, or future,
and evidence is admissible to show the true intention of the par-
ties. And it is not necessary that the instrument correctly describe
the claims or debts intended to be secured.1
But what if subsequent rights intervene before the advance is
actually made? Assuming prior recordation of the security instru-
ment, this question can arise in several ways. The grantor and
debtor may sell and convey to a purchaser for value, without actual
notice, but only constructive notice from recordation. The grantor
may commence construction or repairs, and inchoate mechanics'
liens may attach, dating from the time when the first work is done
or materials furnished, or mechanics' liens may be perfected and
filed. The grantor may execute and record a subsequent mort-
gage or deed of trust, on which an advance may be actually made
before an advance on the first. Judgments against the grantor
may be docketed before an advance is actually made. Do the
rights of such intervening parties take priority over a subsequent
advance by the mortgage creditor?
In the first West Virginia decision, McCarty v. Chalfant,
2 the
validity of a mortgage for future advances was affirmed as between
the parties and subsequent purchasers, after the advances were
made.3  This does not reach the problem under consideration, but
in Barbour v. Tompkins, 4 where the grantor executed interest
' Riggs v. Armstrong, 23 W. Va. 760 (1884); Haas v. Teets, 117 W. Va. 700,
188 S.E. 113 (1936) (trust deed referred to note, did not state amount; held
good as against subsequent lien creditors); Simms v. Ramsey, 79 W. Va. 267,
90 S.E. 842 (1916); Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., 37 W. Va. 73, 16 S.E. 501
(1892) (mortgage for future advances, no subsequent creditors involved). The
mortgage is likewise valid if the debt to be secured, although not termed a
future advance, is not actually advanced until after the execution of the mort-
gage. Pence v. Jamison, 80 Va. 761, 94 S.E. 383 (1917). And see Holley's Ex'r
v. Curry, 58 W. Va. 70, 51 S.E. 135, 112 Am. St. Rep. 944 (1905), where the debt
was described as "whatever amount said B. F. Curry may owe him as such
executor on a settlement," and was held sufficient. In none of these cases was
a question of priority actually involved.
2 14 W. Va. 531 (1878).
3 This was stated in Syllabus 1, and is pure dictum. The court held that
on a proper settlement of accounts between the parties there was nothing due
the trust creditor, and no advances were claimed subsequent to the conveyance
of the property, so that the question of intervening rights did not arise on the
facts.
4 31 W. Va. 410, 7 S.E. 1 (1888). The opinion intimates that if the trust
deed had secured any renewals of the original note, and interest had been added
to such renewals, the trust would cover the accumulated interest so added.
which would then bear interest.
3
Stealey: The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1954
MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES
notes as interest became due on the secured debt, which interest
notes themselves bore interest, it was held that the interest on
interest was a future advance, not entitled to priority over judg-
ments recovered after the execution of the deed of trust. In another
decision5 rendered shortly after, the court said the rationale of the
Barbour case was want of notice to the subsequent purchaser of
the contemplated advance (the trust securing only interest on the
original debt).
From these three cases the formulation of a logical rule might
be deduced, holding the future advance good against encumbrancers
provided the mortgage gave due notice that such an advance
might be made. But subsequent decisions, not discussing these
cases, took a different tangent. Thus, in Lawyer v. Barker the
court held that a mortgage for future advances was a preference
as to existing unsecured creditors of the grantor, even though the
consideration was actually subsequently furnished by the mort-
gagee on the strength of the lien. Such a conclusion seems insup-
portable by logic and authority and has not been followed in West
Virginia or elsewhere, but it serves to cast a serious cloud on the
validity of such mortgages, as the lien creditor cannot know how
many general creditors the borrower may have and whether or not
he may be technically insolvent. Certainly it cannot be assumed
that any court would today hold a mortgage fraudulent as to
5 Bensimer v. Fell, 35 W. Va. 15, 12 S.E. 1078 (1891). Here a debtor had
agreed to pay a judgment creditor a substantial sum (usury not being pleaded)
to forbear enforcement of the judgment. It was held that this sum could not
be tacked to the original judgment as against a subsequent purchaser, because
of want of notice to the purchaser as to the excess at the date of his purchase.
6Lawyer v. Barker, 45 W. Va. 468, 31 S.E. 964 (1898). The deed of trust
covered an equity of redemption in a tract of land and secured a note in a
definite amount for repairs which were completed within two months. Never-
theless, this was held a preference on the authority of Grocer Co. v. Williams,
43 W. Va. 323, 27 S.E. 345 (1897), and Casto v. Greer. 44 W. Va. 332, 30
S.E. 100 (1898). Strangely, these cases involved deeds of trust on stocks of
goods and merchandise, which have long been held void as to creditors in West
Virginia, and have nothing to do with the law of preferences or voluntary
conveyances. If the consideration for the note had been advanced contem-
poraneously, it would have been no preference, because to constitute a preference
there must be a pre-existing debt to prefer. And this is necessarily true as to
a future advance. If the rights of subsequent lien creditors were involved, the
decision would be in point, but it is impossible to visualize a mortgage for
future advances as a preference, and yet that is the ground of decision, syllabus
1, the opinion further saying (45 W. Va. at 471), "A deed of trust for future
advancements or repairs may enable the debtor to place his property beyond
the reach of his creditors." This same contention was rejected by the supreme
court of Virginia in an earlier case. Alexandria Savings Inst. v. Thomas, 29
Gratt. 483 (Va. 1877). Under certain circumstances a mortgage for future
advancements might be used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud creditors,
but there was no such allegation in this case.
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creditors merely because it was given to secure bona fide future
advances, actually made thereafter in reliance thereon.
Then, without mentioning Lawyer v. Barker, or citing any of
the earlier cases, the court decided Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co. 7
in which a mortgage for future advances was accorded priority over
a subsequent mortgage recorded before the advances were made.
It held that in the absence of actual, not constructive, notice of the
execution of the subsequent mortgage, advances by the first mort-
gagee will take priority. The rule, quoting a text authority8 was
stated,
"A prior mortgagee is affected only by actual notice of a
subsequent mortgage, and not by constructive notice from the
recording of the second mortgage, and for all advances made
by such mortgagee before receiving such notice of a subsequent
encumbrance his mortgage is a valid security. Such, it is
conceived, is the rule supported by reason and the weight of
authority. ' " * * * Whetlher the mortgage intended to secure
future advances disclosed the nature of the transaction or not,
there is no good reason why it should not remain a valid
security for all advances that may be made until the mortgagee
receives actual notice of subsequent claims upon the property.
The burden of ascertaining the amount of an existing in-
cumbrance should rest upon him who takes a conveyance on the
property subject to the mortgage. He has notice by the record
of the existence of a mortgage for the full amount of the in-
tended advances, and if he wishes to stop the advances where
they are at the time of recording his subsequent deed, it is only
reasonable to require him to give actual notice of his claim
upon the property; otherwise he should not be heard to com-
plain that the prior encumbrance amounts at any future time
to the full sum for which it appeared of record to be an in-
cumbrance."
Subsequently, in Simms v. Ramsey,9 this rule was reaffirmed, and
there appear to be no later decisions on the subject.
In order to better appraise the situation of the mortgagee or
trust creditor in making future advances, it may be well to examine
the various types of such instruments before mentioned, and the
769 W. Va. 671, 72 S.E. 780 (1911). The deed of trust was to secure
Grocery Company in a sum not to exceed $800 for any and all future sales
and deliveries of goods to the grantors within a period of two years. A subse-
quent deed of trust to Hall & Co. was executed at a time when there was
nothing due Grocery Co. Hall & Co. alleged actual notice to Grocery Co. of
the execution of the subsequent trust, but the court held that the evidence
was insufficient to prove this fact.
8 69 W. Va. at 675, quoting JONES ON MORTGAGES § 872 (6th ed. 1933).
9 79 W. Va. 267, 90 S.E. 842 (1916). The actual point of decision was
whether certain debts were secured by the trust, but the opinion restates the
rule of Hall v. Grocery Co., supra note 7, without citing that case, or any of
the earlier decisions.
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application of these decisions and other pertinent authorities from
other jurisdictions.
The problem under consideration is peculiarly evident in
construction loans where the funds are advanced during, or after,
construction. As mechanics' liens attach from the time the first
work is done or materials furnished, 10 there are always some such
inchoate liens in existence until after the work is completed and
all potential lienors paid or until the period of limitation (ninety
days) for filing has elapsed. What then, is the priority of advances
where the instrument is recorded before work begun but the
advances made during the course of construction?
If the principle of Hall v. Grocery Co."l be applied literally,
in most instances the mortgage construction advances would prob-
ably be subordinate to the mechanics' liens, as almost every such
lender has actual notice of the pendency of construction and of the
fact that work is being done and materials furnished, although
whether actual notice existed of any particular mechanics' or
materialmen's claim would, in each case, be a question of fact.'
2
Unless, therefore, the mortgagee secures releases or waivers from
each possible mechanic lien claimant, the priority of subsequent
advances under the prior mortgage would be in doubt, as it would
turn, in each instance, on the question of actual notice. This is
not an enviable state of the law for the construction loan mortgagee,
10 W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 2, § 17 (Michie, 1949). Mechanics' liens take
priority over a deed of trust recorded subsequent to the commencement of work.
Cushwa v. Imp. L. & B. Ass'n, 45 W. Va. 490, 32 S.E. 259 (1898).
11 69 W. Va. 671, 72 S.E. 780 (1911).
12 There are no West Virginia cases involving priority between construc-
tion loans and mechanics' liens in which either the question of priority or the
subsidiary question of notice has arisen. In Cushwa v. Imp. L. & B. Ass'n, 45
W. Va. 490, 32 S.E. 259 (1898), and Houston Lumber Co. v. W. & T. Ry., 69
W. Va. 682, 72 S.E. 786 (1911), it was held that the mechanics' lien was prior
for the full amount, including work done or material furnished subsequent
to the recording of the deed of trust, where the deed of trust was recorded
after work had commenced. Of course, the mechanics' lien can attach only
to such interest as the person contracting for the work may own, so a vendor's
lien is superior, Charleston L. & M. Co. v. Brockmeyer, 18 W. Va. 586 (1881),
even if reserved in a deed executed and delivered subsequent to the commence-
ment of work. And where the person contracting for the work has no title,
legal or equitable, no lien can attach. Mahan v. Bitting, 103 W. Va. 449, 137
S.E. 889, 52 A.L.R. 689 (1927). There appears to be a division of authority
as to whether more than notice that work is being performed is necessary to
constitute actual notice of intervening liens. Cf. IV. A. Allen Co. v. Emerson,
108 Me. 221, 79 Atl. 905 (1911), and Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E.
1093 (1913) (knowledge of construction sufficient); Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal.
383, 19 Pac. 641, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288 (1888) (actual notice of particular lien neces-
sary); Kentucky Lumber etc. Co. v. Trust Co., 184 Ky. 244, 211 S.W. 765, 5
A.L.R. 391 (1919) (mere knowledge of construction not sufficient).
6
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and it is surprising the question has not reached the supreme court
of appeals.
In certain other jurisdictions, apart from statutes which some-
times regulate construction mortgages,13 priority is made to turn
upon whether the making of the advances is obligatory upon and
not merely optional with the mortgagee. 14 This principle is not
mentioned in any of the West Virginia decisions, but it is often
a decisive factor in other jurisdictions, also, in other types of
mortgages for future advances, as will be noticed hereafter. Cer-
tainly, if the advances are obligatory, actual knowledge of inter-
vening mechanics' liens should not defeat the priority of the ad-
vances, but some of the cases require both an obligation to advance,
and lack of actual notice. And some allow priority to optional
advances, where made before actual notice.15 But in one jurisdic-
tion, priority is allowed only to the extent the advances are actually
used in construction, regardless of obligation or notice. The con-
struction mortgagee is required to use diligence to ascertain that
the advances are so used.16
In one class of cases only does there seem to be unanimity of
opinion in allowing priority to the mortgagees. Where the mort-
gage secures an issue of negotiable notes or bonds, which are to be
sold to third parties, the mortgage is accorded priority as of its
13 In Virginia, a construction loan, even though recorded prior to the com-
mencement of work, is subordinate to mechanics' liens. Rust v. Indiana Flooring
Co., 151 Va. 845, 145 S.E. 321 (1928). And a prior mortgage takes precedence
only to the extent of the estimated value of the land without the structure.
VA. CODE §§ 43-20, 43-21 (1950). Thus, short of complete supervision of the
project, the security of the construction mortgagee rises no higher than the
integrity of the owner and general contractor, if any.
14 W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027 (1920)
(advancements optional, no priority); Valley Lumber Co. v. Wright, 2 Cal. App.
288, 84 Pac. 58 (1905) (advancements obligatory, priority); Weissman v. Volino,
84 Conn. 326. 80 At. 81 (1911); Erickson v. Ireland, 134 Minn. 156, 158 N.W.
918 (1916) (advancements obligatory, priority although notice of construction);
Alexandria Savings Inst. v. Thomas, 29 Gratt. 483 (1877) (if obligatory, priority
although actual knowledge; if optional, priority if no knowledge).
15 Cf. Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 Pac. 641 (1888), where the rule
is stated to require both, and W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 185,
191 Pac. 1027 (1920), where the obligation to advance is held sufficient.
16 First National Bank v. Virden, 208 Miss. 679, 45 So.2d 268 (1950).
Mortgage recorded before start of construction, and loan advance in installments
by mortgagee without ascertaining state of construction, and without actual
knowledge as to particulars thereof. Of $11,200 only $7,315.76 went into con-
struction. The mortgage was accorded priority only to the extent of the
funds which actually were used in construction, the court holding that it was
the duty of the mortgagee to see to the application of the funds even though
the advances were obligatory, saying, "The mortgagee, in a case such as this,
should advance the proceeds with reasonable diligence in order that the holders
of statutory liens may not be unjustly defeated in their claims. It is simple
justice that such mortgagee shall have preference only to the extent that its
funds actually went into construction."
7
Stealey: The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1954
MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES
recordation, regardless of the time of actual sale of the notes or
bonds, or of equities, such as mechanics' liens, which may have
intervened before they are sold.'7  The opinion in Central Trust
Co. v. Continental Iron Works," a leading case, quotes from the
opinion in Reed's Appeal 9 as to the rationale of the rule:
"Where a mortgage is given to cover future advances of
one man to another, it is not a matter of much inconvenience
for the mortgagee to ascertain, from time to time, as he is
called on for advances, whether there be intervening liens. But
a different case is presented where a public improvement is
undertaken, requiring the expenditure of large sums of money
and the floating of a debt of great magnitude. The debt is
necessarily divided into small parts and carried into different
and distant markets. It would be out of the question to ascer-
tain the state of the record or of the company's affairs each time
a bond was about to be sold. If this were made the duty of
purchasers it would prevent the sale of such securities al-
together, or at least confine their purchase to such large con-
cerns as could buy in bulk after due and careful inquiry; even
then the facts would be open to doubt at every subsequent
sale. Thus, their value would be entirely reduced."
This is, indeed, pragmatic law, not based on legal principle or
logical reasoning, but purely upon the supposed convenience of
the parties. Logically and historically, the law makes no distinc-
tion between the number of persons who may be affected by a rule
of law. A hundred persons should have no greater rights than
one. And it is, of course, pure hypothesis to premise that one
person may have greater access to the facts that a hundred, as the
greater number can, and often do, more effectively protect their
interests through agents or representatives.
As the usual construction loan is made by only one mortgagee,
is there, then, any practical manner by which such construction
loan mortgagee may be assured of actual priority, where the mort-
gage is recorded prior to the commencement of any construction?
The entire loan can, of course, be advanced simultaneously with
recordation," but few mortgagees are willing to so trust the owner.
A common practice is to advance only as construction progresses in
certain stages, but this offers no protection unless all the potential
17 Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn.
445, 214 N.W. 503, 53 A.L.R. 573 (1927); Central Trust Co. v. Continental Iron
Works, 51 N.J. Eq. 605, 28 Atl. 595, 40 Am. St. Rep. 539 (1894). Both involved
intervening mechanics' liens, although the rule is the same regardless of the
nature of the intervening lien claim.
1s Supra note 17.
19 122 Pa. St. 565, 16 Atl. 100 (1888).
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lien claimants are, in fact, paid as the advances are made. If partial
waivers or releases are secured from those performing the work,
before making an advance, the lender has actual notice of their
possible future claims and liens, and can safely make no subse-
quent advance without another release or waiver. But securing
such releases or waivers is, indeed, the only sure means of protec-
tion to the mortgagee, as impractical and difficult as it may be.
Eternal vigilance is the only assurance of safety, where priority is
so dependent upon extrinsic circumstances.
Certainly, the rule ought to be that future advances pursuant
to an agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee, obligating
the latter to make them, are protected irrespective of notice of
intervening liens. And this is no less true of other types of mort-
gages for future advances. And although there is no authority in
West Virginia on the question, most of the courts which have con-
sidered the problem do allow priority to obligatory advances, ir-
respective of intervening liens or actual notice thereof. As one
Court put it,20 "to hold that under such circumstances a subsequent
mortgagee and a stranger could arrest the performance of such a
contract, against the will of the immediate parties, would be
practically to impair its obligations." But "optional" has usually
been treated in the sense of "not obligatory" or "not required,"
and so has resulted sometimes in priority being denied where the
mortgagee is given the right to make further expenditures, at his
option, on the security of the mortgaged premises, 21 irrespective
of the consent or lack thereof of the mortgagor.
Almost every mortgage or deed of trust contains a provision
of this type for a future advance to protect the security. Commonly,
the mortgagee is permitted to pay taxes, procure insurance, defend
litigation, and by various other means make independent advances
and tack the same to the secured debt. As to taxes the mortgagee
is clearly entitled to priority under the principle subrogating the
lien holder to the lien of the state,22 but the status of other advances,
not so privileged, would seem in doubt, since the mortgagee might
decline to make the advances. But where failure to make the ad-
20 Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893). The advances were of
building materials for use in construction, pursuant to a contract.
21In Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash.2d 29, 116 P.2d 253, 138
A.L.R. 558 (1941), the construction mortgage gave the lender, at its option, the
right to complete the dwelling upon abandonment by the owner. At the
time of abandonment, the mortgagee had actual notice of a second mortgage,
but finished the dwelling in order to make it salable. The court held this an
optional advance and junior to the second mortgage.
22 Henry v. Musgrave, 113 W. Va. 448, 168 S.E. 474 (1933).
9
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vances subjects the mortgagee to risk of loss, they cannot be termed
optional in a realistic sense.
23
Actually the optional advance should mean only such advance
as requires the concurrent request or consent of the mortgagor.
If the mortgagor is bound by contract to permit the advance, and
the recorded mortgage gives notice of this fact, third parties should
have no right to alter the pre-existing agreement.
The West Virginia cases, disregarding Lawyer v. Barker,21 all
seem to involve the truly optional future advance and accord with
the majority rule in other jurisdictions which gives them priority
over subsequent liens, except after actual notice of such intervening
liens, constructive notice by the recordation of the intervening lien
being insufficient.25 Certain decisions in other jurisdictions support
the contrary doctrine and accord priority to the optional advance,
where the subsequent encumbrancer had record or other sufficient
notice.26 And under either view it is immaterial whether the
recorded mortgage so describes the indebtedness or advances secur-
ed thereby so that the intervening encumbrancer could have deter-
mined from the mortgage the true amounts secured. 2
21 This distinction is recognized in Re Harris, 156 Misc. 805, 282 N.Y. Supp.
571 (1935). In Cedar v. Roche Fruit Co., 16 Wash. 652, 134 P.2d 437 (1943) the
same court which decided Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash.2d 29, 116
P.2d 253 (1941), recognized as obligatory advances by the mortgagee necessary
to protect a crop and prepare it for sale.
24 But in Lawyer v. Barker, 45 W. Va. 468, 31 S.E. 964 (1898), it may well
be inferred that an agreement had been made by the mortgagee to make the
repairs for the mortgagor, and hence his performance was not optional. Cer-
tainly his rights were not less than the mortgagee in Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y.
48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893).
25 The following cases are illustrative, but not exhausive. Savings & L. Soc.
v. Burnett, 106 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 922 (1895) (record notice not sufficient); DuBois
v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 Pac. 169 (1908) (same); Schmidt v. Zahrndt,
148 Ind. 447, 47 N.E. 335 (1897) (same); Brinkmeyer v. Browneller, 55 Ind.
487 (1876) (actual notice defeats priority); Heintze v. Bentley, 34 N.J. Eq. 562
(1881) (actual notice through judicial proceedings); Alexandria Savings Inst. v.
Thomas, 29 Gratt. 483 (Va. 1877) (knowledge of subsequent encumbrance de-
feats priority). There are a few cases contra to the effect that mere recordation
of the intervening encumbrance is sufficient to cut off priority of advances under
the prior mortgage.
26 Texas appears to adhere to this view. jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust, 15
S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Mercantile Co. v. Hause, 184 S.W. 737
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916). Mississippi has usually been cited as supporting it,
but in North v. J. W. McClintock, 208 Miss. 289, 44 So.2d 412 (1950), the
supreme court of Mississippi, with one dissent, refused to follow Witczinski v.
Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876).
271Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 671, 72 S.E. 780 (1911);
Mercantile Co. v. Hause, 184 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Bullard v. Fender,
140 Fla. 448, 192 So. 167 (1939); Union National Bank v. Moline, 7 N.D. 201,
73 N.W. 527 (1897).
10
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It is the opinion of this writer that a duly recorded mortgage
or deed of trust for future advances, optional or not, which states
with sufficient clarity the amount and character of future advances
which it is intended to secure, should take priority as to future ad-
vances over subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers, whatever
the nature of the encumbrance and regardless of actual notice or
knowledge of the subsequent lien. It is certainly no hardship to
the mortgagee to require that the amount and extent of future ad-
vances be stated with reasonable accuracy, in order that subsequent
parties may have notice of the possible extent of his claim. *While
this opinion is bottomed more upon the hard facts of modern
financing than upon any attempt to do theoretical justice as be-
tween encumbrancers, which is the sole justification for the prevail-
ing rule, it is certainly not unfair to subsequent parties.
Theoretically, perhaps, the first mortgagee may suffer no loss
if his right to make an optional advance is cut off by actual notice
of an intervening equity. This may be a just rule as between in-
dividual mortgagees, but it will not work as to corporate lenders,
which are by far the greater proportion of mortgage lenders today.
What constitutes actual notice to a corporation? As is often the
case, the general rule is easy to state but difficult to apply. Broadly
speaking, corporations are bound by the knowledge acquired by
their officers or agents acting within the actual or apparent scope
of their authority.28 Thus, it is not only possible, but often prob-
able, that notice to one officer may not actually be communicated
to another officer or employee actually handling the advances. Thus
the only safe course for the corporate lender is complete investiga-
tion before any advance, and the difficulties of that have already
been pointed out in discussion of the construction loan.
The rule allowing a subsequent encumbrancer to cut off the
right of a prior mortgagee is, in fact, but an offshoot of the tradi-
tional vigilant watch kept by the courts to prevent a debtor from
conveying his property so as to delay or hinder even subsequent
28 There are, of course, exceptions. American National Bank v. Ritz, 70
W. Va. 409, 74 S.E. 679, 40 L.R.A. (N.s.) 156 (1912), where the interest of the
officer is adverse to the bank; First National Bank v. Lowther-Kaufman Oil &
Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 505, 66 S.E. 713, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 511 (1909), same as to
director. The ramifications of the rule are beyond the scope of this article.
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creditors.29 Further, the recording acts have been construed to
have no application to creditors, except as to the rights of purchas-
ers for a valuable consideration without notice.3 0 Thus it is but
logical for the courts to view the prior mortgagee as a voluntary
grantee as to the advances not yet made. Indeed, stretching that
logic to its end result, all mortgages would be void as to the ad-
vances not yet made, as the supreme court actually once held in
the Barker-1 case.
But why should not the subsequent encumbrancer take sub-
ject to the prior recorded instrument, if that fairly discloses the
facts? The public records are open to all, and it is no hardship to
require an interested encumbrancer to take notice of and subject
to what they may disclose. If displeased, he may proceed no further,
and can lose nothing. Why should the subsequent encumbrancer
be permitted to destroy the right of the prior mortgagee to make
future advances secured by an instrument of record? This view
would require, of course, a change of the presently prevailing rule
that it is unnecessary for the mortgage to truly disclose the advances
to be secured. In all "open-end" mortgages and all construction
mortgages which this writer has seen, the possible amount of any
future advance is now stated.
It is interesting to note that if the debtor should pledge in-
tangibles, such as notes or securities, the pledgee may make further
advances without risk, so long as he retains possession of the pledge,
barring, of course, a creditors' suit to reach the pledgor's equity.
The law of real property conveyancing has advanced far since the
day when livery of seisin, or physical transfer of possession of the
land was requisite, to place it on an equality with the ease of
transferring, or pledging, intangible personalty, but the present
status of the law as to future advances secured by real property
is so fraught with peril for the lender as to make doubtful the
wisdom of making such loans on so precarious a security. The
situation can, and should, be remedied by legislation, particularly
as to construction loans.
29W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, §§ 1, 8 (Michie, 1949). While the latter
section provides that as to subsequent creditors a conveyance shall not be set
aside solely because voluntary, yet if the subsequent creditor proves that the
grantor had existing creditors at the time of his conveyance, and there was not
left in his hands an ample amount of estate to satisfy the existing creditors, the
conveyance was deemed fraudulent as to subsequent creditors also. Rogers v.
Verlander, 30 W. Va. 619, 5 S.E. 847 (1888).
30 Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 121 W. Va. 41, 1 S.E.2d 251 (1939).
Of course, mortgagees are conceded to be purchasers for a valuable considera-
tion as to advances contemporaneously made.
31 Lawyer v. Barker, 45 W. Va. 468, 31 S.E. 964 (1898).
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